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Executive	Summary	
This briefing note, prepared by Loughborough University for the ESRC UK in a 
Changing Europe Initiative, reviews the choices for UK trade arrangements after 
Brexit. It draws on public domain research by leading UK trade researchers and on 
the presentations and discussions at a conference, hosted by Loughborough 
University at our Queen Elizabeth Park, Stratford, London Campus, on Dec 9th, 2017. 
A misleading characterisation. Media and political discussion has characterised 
Brexit as a binary choice between ‘soft’ (retaining current trade arrangements with 
the EU) and ‘hard’ (jettisoning all existing trade arrangements in order to start out 
afresh). This is a dangerous oversimplification. It ignores the realities of negotiation 
with the EU and other trade partners (the choice is not all or nothing, rather we have 
an opportunity in negotiation to agree anything across a wide range of potential 
outcomes) and the practical challenge of replacing the large investments in existing 
trade arrangements by both UK business and UK government. 
A better analogy: moving house. Brexit is better seen as the decision of a family to 
leave an old house in order to move into a new building with better facilities. The 
family has agreed that the move is worth the costs involved and a final decision has 
been made to leave. This does not mean that it is necessary to leave the old house 
today and live in the open air while the new house is being constructed.  
Constructing of the new building will take time. A comparatively straightforward 
step is leaving the EU Customs Union and imposing external tariffs largely based on 
those that currently apply externally to the EU (this can be done through a 
‘rectification’, transferring all commitments on tariffs agreed by the EU on behalf of 
the UK back to the UK as a full member of the WTO). This though will still take 
months and require investment in systems and procedures at the UK frontier.  
Non-tariff trade barriers (regulations, products standards) and rules applying to trade 
in services – I.e. where we currently benefit from deep and comprehensive 
arrangements of the EU single market – are more difficult, not least because of the 
requirement for mutual recognition of standards and regulations and a process of 
dispute resolution when compliance is questioned. Creating the apparatus for 
monitoring non-tariff barriers for UK trade both with the EU and countries outside the 
EU, with all the systems and staff required, will take one or two years not months. 
Obtaining the ‘permissions’ for a construction plan will take even longer. We 
need to agree new trade arrangements with our EU partners and other countries (we 
cannot just adopt existing arrangements since that would be staying in the single 
market and customs union that we plan to leave). This will take several years.  
Tariff-arrangements are again more straightforward. Most EU external tariffs are 
fairly low. The principal exceptions are motor cars and motor car parts and 
agricultural products. It should be possible to negotiate these two sectors as special 
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cases and find a solution of mutual benefit (as we discuss the supply chains of the 
motor industry cross from the UK/EU several times, in order to avoid substantial cost 
increases both UK and EU car manufacturers will be insistent on eliminating or 
substantially reducing these tariffs; UK agriculture likely has to accept tariffs on 
exports to the EU though ‘tariff quota agreements’ will need extensive discussion). 
Agreement should be possible in a year or two.  
Negotiation of non-tariff arrangements with the EU is where the greatest problems 
arise, requiring sector by sector agreement (in financial services, law, architecture, 
other business services, motor cars, aeronautics, pharmaceuticals, food and drink, to 
mention just a few prominent sectors). Some institutional arrangement will also be 
needed to police agreements (one way to speed up final agreement will be to allow 
the ECJ jurisdiction over UK-EU trade, but some in the UK prefer the creation of a 
special independent legal authority). Moreover nothing is agreed until everything is 
agreed. Based on past experience of international trade negotiations – which have 
never attempted such a deep and comprehensive reworking of trade as must now 
take place between the EU and the UK – a period of ten years could be needed. 
With good will and hard work, this may be achievable in about five years. 
Cost v. Time. Figure 1 illustrates the possible choices for our future trading 
arrangements, analysed in the two dimensions of cost and time.  
Figure	1:	the	three	choices	for	future	UK	trading	arrangements	
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No-one wants a costly Brexit that takes a long time (hence there is no choice 
presented in the upper-right quadrant of Figure 1). There is though an unavoidable 
trade-off of cost and time. Doing Brexit quickly makes it unavoidably costly because 
we are then unable to replace the single market rules with the EU with a new 
framework to overcome non-tariff barriers to UK-EU trade (the ‘rapid Brexit’ box on 
the lower right hand quadrant of the Figure). The research that we review indicates 
that while the costs of a rapid Brexit are highly uncertain they will involve a loss of 
UK per capita consumption and GDP of the order of 5-8%.  
There are two other possible choices. One is a reversal of the decision to leave on 
the lower left hand quadrant of Figure 1. The UK would then be able to stay in the 
Single Market and European Customs Union. This though does not seem politically 
feasible (while some in the UK continue to call for remaining in the single market and 
customs union, this would appear to require also continuing to make EU budget 
contributions and accept full freedom of movement of labour; unless the European 
Union puts on the table at the beginning of negotiations a substantial concessions on 
either or both of these issues, such an outcome does not appear compatible with the 
decision made in the June 2016 referendum).  
The final choice, in the upper left quadrant of Figure 1, is a slow and managed Brexit. 
This will require a transition period of several years, during which the UK will 
presumably continue to make EU budget contributions and participate in the customs 
union and single market. Withdrawal first from the customs union and then later from 
the single market can then take place, with these arrangements replaced by a deep 
and comprehensive free trade agreements with the EU. While the time involved, five 
to seven years, will frustrate some supporters of Brexit this is necessary if we are to 
respect the referendum outcome and leave the European Union while avoiding 
substantial costs to the UK economy. 
The quotation from Othello, on our title page, captures something of what may very 
well still end in tragedy. No point in mourning a mischief that is past and gone. Both 
sides of the referendum debate are at fault for not moving on, accepting that a final 
decision has been made on the UK’s membership of the EU, and working together 
on the protracted task of executing that decision in a carefully managed and least 
cost fashion, a task which must extend well beyond the latest possible date for the 
next general election in 2022.  
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1. Introduction	
Trade arrangements are now, for the first time in many years, at the centre of UK 
policy discussion. As a member of the EU, our trade arrangements have been 
determined by our membership of both the Single Market and the European 
Customs Union, effectively outsourcing our trade arrangements to supra-national 
institutions. Now they are a domestic issue at the heart of economic policy making. 
These are golden times for trade economists. 
Despite this elevation, most discussion of trade arrangements before and since the 
referendum have been simplistic, moving little beyond largely unsubstantiated 
campaign claims. We still hear extreme views, either (as many campaigners for 
leave have asserted) that departure from the European Union presents an 
opportunity for an immediate and transformative lowering of trade barriers for UK 
exports and imports; or (as the remain campaign argued) that any alteration of trade 
arrangements that the UK shares with the EU threatens a substantial decline of both 
living standards and employment. 
Reality is more nuanced than either of these campaigning positions. This note 
provides a briefing on the issues, providing some key information which should be 
understand by all those concerned with the future of UK trade arrangements outside 
of the European Union. It also argues that a key tradeoff in post-EU trade 
arrangements – that between the speed with which the UK exits the EU and the 
costs of so doing – is being ignored (see Figure 1 of the Executive Summary)..  
The material here is of three kinds. First (in Section 2) we provide a discussion of the 
economics of trade and of the ways in which trade affects the economy. There is still 
considerable confusion in UK debate, for example between the Single Market and 
the Customs Union, which are often viewed as much the same thing (they are very 
different). Also the mental models of many journalists and politicians are drawn from 
the last period when trade arrangements were at the centre of UK political debate, i.e. 
at the time of the abolition of the corn laws in the first half of the19th century. 
International trade today is very different than two centuries ago, with manufacturing 
based on international supply chains across many countries and services accounting 
for a major share of all trade (this is especially true for the UK). This section also 
contains a review of current research on the economic impact of re-organising UK 
trade arrangements post-Brexit.  
Second (in Section 3) we summarise the institutional arrangements that support 
international trade and the lowering of barriers to trade. These involve both tariff 
barriers and most importantly non-tariff barriers. The main point we make here is that 
UK trade, as they have developed over the past half century as members of the EU, 
rely heavily on participation in  the European Customs Union and in particular, with 
regard to non-tariff barriers, the EU Single Market. While both can be replaced with 
new arrangements that do not require us to be memb3ers of the European Union, 
this is a complex task that will take several years. We also in this section discuss 
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some of the challenges involved in renegotiation of trade arrangements. While new 
arrangements can be reached in which the barriers to trade between the EU and the 
UK are about as low as they are today, and in which we have greater freedom than 
we currently have to establish our own trading relationships with the rest of the world,  
It is clear that it will take several years, we think with good will and hard work around 
five years, to agree this new framework. 
Finally (in Section 4), we present some descriptive statistics and visualisation of 
trade data, with the aim of providing key factual information to a broad audience. 
This material, which can be omitted on a first reading, reinforces the analysis of 
Sections 2 and 3, confirming that the UK currently relies to a large degree on trade 
with the EU and with other European countries. While there is scope for trade 
agreements that support expansion of trade with countries outside of the EU (we 
argue on the basis of our review of these statistics that a free trade agreement with 
Switzerland should be the first priority for a new arrangement of this kind) the 
benefits of these new arrangements will only accrue slowly and gradually and will be 
far too small to compensate for an abrupt dislocation of trade with the European 
Union.  
Our executive summary does NOT seek to repeat the detailed information contained 
in this briefing (which is already a summary of a wide range of information). Instead it 
presents what we take to be the central message of the large body of available 
research on trade arrangements after Brexit (some sponsored by the ESRC who 
have also supported our work). While new arrangements can certainly be found 
outside of the EU that facilitate UK trade across the world without imposing 
substantial costs on UK households and businesses, this is a complex task (we 
make the analogy to planning and then building a new house) which will take 5 to 7 
years. Attempting a rapid Brexit in one to two years will impose a fall in UK per capita 
consumption and GDP of the order of 5 to 8%.  
It is a political decision whether, in the light of the referendum result, the UK will 
pursue a rapid but costly Brexit or a slow and managed Brexit with full and careful 
negotiation of new trade agreements to minimise tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade 
and hence avoid substantial costs on the UK economy. It is the responsibility though 
of the research community to make those taking this decision aware that rapid Brexit 
with an immediate departure from the Single Market and European Customs Union 
in March 2019 will be extremely costly when compared to the alternative of a 
managed transition process lasting 5-7 years.    
We also note that failure to recognise the complex challenges and time involved in 
creating new trading arrangements threatens a tragic outcome. The UK may well 
end up being forced, by political shortsightedness and refusal to compromise, into a 
costly rapid Brexit even though this is an outcome that no-one actually wants. 
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2. The	economics	of	international	trade	and	international	
trade	arrangements:	a	sketch	
a. The	Economic	Rationale	for	Free	Trade	
As we teach our undergraduate students, the economic rationale for trade is 
essentially the rationale for specialisation in general. I am an apple grower, but am 
short of wheat. My neighbour grows wheat, and is short of apples. The reason I sell 
apples is because it enables me to purchase wheat. 
The same rationale applies to trade. The gain from trade is that the goods which we 
import are worth more to us than the goods which we export (but to someone else, 
the goods we sell them are worth more to them than the goods they sell us). Hence 
exchange is valuable. 
So the basic purpose of trade is to import. Exports are the price to us of those 
imports. This also means that the benefits of trade depend on the terms of trade, the 
more favourable are the terms of trade (i.e. the more imports per unit exported) then 
the larger the economic gain from trade. The benefit of an improvement in one 
country’s terms of trade (whether from an appreciation in the exchange rate or an 
increase in the prices of its exported traded goods and services) is usually, however, 
matched by a deterioration in other countries terms of trade. 
For understanding the impact of trade arrangements, economists start by 
considering a ‘small’ country, which cannot manipulate its terms of trade (because it 
faces too much competition to be able to drive up its export price by restricting 
supply). 
This is contrasted with a ‘large’ country, or conglomerate of countries (e.g. a 
Customs Union), which can drive up their export prices at the expense of their 
neighbours. 
However, any country which produces differentiated goods can manipulate its terms 
of trade. This means that in economic terms almost no country is small.  
Econometric studies suggest that most countries face an elasticity of demand for 
their exports of around 5.4 This means that a 1% rise in export prices (or in tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to trade) leads to a 5% fall in export volumes (over time). 
                                            
4 Head, K., & Mayer, T. (2014). Gravity Equations: Workhorse,Toolkit, and Cookbook. In G. Gopinath, 
E. Helpman, & K. Rogoff (Eds.), Handbook of International Economics Vol 4. (pp. 131–195). Elsevier. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-54314-1.00003-3 present a meta-analysis, which pools the results 
of a large number of studies of international trade. 
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A country can drive up its export price by a number of means. However, the simplest 
way is to restrict its own demand for imports from its neighbours, by a tariff. Say 
Britain puts a tariff on its imports. This leads to a trade surplus, which drives up the 
value of sterling. Consequently, the price (to our neighbours) of exports increases. 
We are purchasing more imports per unit export, and feel better off. 
Of course, if everybody does this, then trade is more costly and the gains from trade 
are reduced. 
The rationale for bilateral (or multilateral) trade liberalisation can be seen in terms of 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Table 1 below shows Britain and France’s welfare in 
response to different trade policies (for each cell, the first number represents 
France’s welfare, the second number represents Britain’s welfare). 
Table	1:	trade	agreements	as	a	‘prisoner’s	dilemma’	
  France  
  Impose trade 
barrier  
Impose no trade 
barrier 
Britain Impose trade 
barrier 
100,100 50,160 
 Impose no trade 
barrier 
160,50 125, 125 
    
 
Collectively, both countries are better off with no trade barriers than in the cases 
where with either one imposes a trade barrier, or where both impose a trade barrier. 
However, consider how Britain responds if it takes French policy as given. 
If France imposes a trade barrier, Britain is better off (100 against 50) imposing a 
trade barrier itself. And if France imposes no trade barrier, Britain is better off (160 
against 125) imposing a trade barrier. 
The same logic applies to France. So in the absence of cooperation, Britain and 
France will both impose trade barriers. But both can make themselves better off by 
making an agreement not to impose trade barriers on each other.  
b. Bargaining	power	
Whether or not the two countries, in a situation such as Table 1, are able to agree to 
a co-operative outcome and the extent to which they can capture the gains from co-
operation, depends on their bargaining power. Table 1 assumes that the situation is 
symmetric. But the threat i.e. not to co-operate is less effective the greater the loss 
when comparing the co-operative and non-cooperative outcome. If this loss is large, 
then a country is mostly likely to agree to co-operate and to accept a relatively small 
share of the overall gains of co-operation.  
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So how much bargaining power the UK will have in the negotiation of low trade 
barriers with the remaining EU members? In terms of the standard rationale for free 
trade (i.e. that the purpose of exporting is to purchase imports and hence increase 
consumption possibilities) the issue is then how large is the overall increase in trade, 
exports and imports, from a reduction in barriers to trade. If a country relies to a 
relatively large extent on a particular trading partner for imports and exports, and (as 
is generally accepted for most traded goods and services) the price elasticities of 
demand are relatively low, then it faces relatively great costs from imposing reducing 
barriers to trade and is in a weak bargaining position.  
The key issue is thus dependence. If country A depends more for its exports and/or 
imports on country B than the other way around, then it has fewer alternatives, and is 
in a less strong bargaining position. It is the importance of the partner in total exports 
and imports, not the trade balance, which matters. 
On this basic criterion, the UK is in a rather weak position relative to the rump EU 
(Table 2). This table suggest that UK citizens would suffer approximately four times 
as much as EU citizens from a failure to reach a co-operative solution for our trade 
arrangements once the UK leaves the EU. Hence the UK is in a weak bargaining 
position. [This is the direct opposite of the conclusion reached by many 
commentators, who have argued that because the EU exports a lot more to the UK 
than the UK exports to the EU that the UK has a stronger bargaining position than 
the UK.]   
Table	2:	UK	–	EU27	trade	as	a	share	of	their	respective	total	global	trade.	
 
However, we are ignoring the effects on particular interest groups, those individuals 
whose livelihoods are closely tied to the performance of export industries (for 
example German motor manufacturers and their employees). It is true that these 
interest groups are likely to be organised and vocal, so to that extent the EU may be 
reluctant to exert its bargaining power as strongly as is suggested by Table 2. As 
discussed in the next sub-section, such distributional impacts are an important 
consideration.  
There are also political pressures for the EU to ‘punish’ the UK in order to deter other 
member states from leaving the EU. While exporters may suffer, they have many 
2011 $m  UK UK 
Imports from EU27 418743.2 Exports to EU27 348441.5 
All imports 858485.1 All Exports 676202.5 
EU27 % 48.78% EU27% 51.53% 
EU27 EU27 
Imports from UK 348441.5 Exports to UK 418743.2 
Imports from outside 
EU27 2964446 
Exports to outside 
EU27 2800381 
UK % 11.75% UK % 14.95% 
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other export markets and overall there seems relatively little, in terms of the impact 
on EU citizens as a whole, to prevent EU negotiators achieving an outcome in which 
the UK loses relative to our current membership of the EU. Ultimately this is an issue 
of diplomacy – both sides can lose from a bad deal – so we need frank, friendly and 
constructive dialogue, over a period of years, to achieve a good outcome.  
c. Distributional	impacts,	structural	rigidities	and	special	interest	
lobbying	
Given that the purpose of trade is to consume, why then does almost all media and 
political discussion focus instead on the promotion of exports as a goal in its own 
right? One reason is that the standard economic analysis of the economics of free 
trade as we have recounted it, in which the purpose of trade is to acquire imports to 
increase consumption possibilities, omits the distributional impacts of trade 
liberalisation and its impacts on particular groups. 
Agreement between two countries to lower trade barriers can be expected to 
increase consumption possibilities for both. This though does not guarantee that all 
citizens of both countries are able to consume more than would be possible for them 
without a trade agreement. Within any individual country, many people’s incomes are 
tied up with exporting a particular good, or in competition against or co-operation 
with imports of a particular good, and also maybe with trade to a particular 
destination.  
This is an important issue, even though trade economists usually view it as 
secondary. There many possible ways of compensating people for losses from trade 
agreements, for example via specific retooling or re-training programmes, as well as 
regional subsidies or the tax and benefits system. Still it must be recognised that this 
compensation will not always happen. The challenges of redistribution are greater if 
there are structural problems which result in underemployed resources (labour of 
human and physical capital) in some regions or amongst some population groups 
and hence expose some citizens to relatively large potential income losses. Even 
with the usual tools of redistribution such as progressive taxation and social security 
benefits, the reduction of trade barriers will result in losers as well as gainers.  
This in turn means that any discussion about changes to trade arrangements will be 
accompanied by intense lobbying from domestic special interest groups, seeking to 
obtain exceptions or special concessions that will give them particular advantage; 
and potentially substantial political opposition, especially when losers are able to 
form effective political coalitions.  
d. Dynamic	gains	from	trade	
Reducing trade costs can yield further substantial benefits by raising productivity: i.e. 
the so called dynamic gains from trade. 
One reason for this is that traded goods are an important input into production. 
These inputs are not just intermediate inputs, but also capital goods. For example, in 
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the UK in 2014, almost half of all output was accounted for by intermediates 
expenditure and nearly one quarter by fixed capital (Figure 2). 
Figure	2:	UK	Industry’s	Costs.	
 
In total some 70% of total costs are attributed to intermediates and capital. Cheaper 
imported inputs, whether from reductions in trade barriers or improvement in the 
‘terms of trade’, mean more of these will be used per head and productivity is 
increased. 
In addition, there are scale-related gains. This reflects two important factors: 
1. Larger markets give access to a greater variety of more specialised inputs, 
which raises productivity. 
2. Larger markets allow firms to carry out more R&D expenditure, and raise 
innovation. 
These gains are largest in the situation where goods are differentiated and there are 
economies of scale in production, so that there are a relatively small number of 
competing producers (imperfect competition).  
Most industries, both in goods and in services, are imperfectly competitive. For these 
industries reducing barriers to trade is especially important, for both static and 
dynamic reasons.  
 With economies of scale in production, lowering barriers to trade allows 
greater specialisation of production, lowering costs and increasing the choice 
of products available for consumption (a static gain) 
 As barriers to trade are lowered, the rate of innovation increases, leading to 
faster increases in productivity, more growth and in turn creating even greater 
incentives for innovation==> A VIRTUOUS CIRCLE (dynamic gain).  
UK Industry's Costs 2014. 
Total £3.14 tr. UK Input‐output tables
Intermediates
Capital
Wages
Taxes
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 Protection, on the other hand, has the opposite effect, reducing specialisation 
of production (a static loss) and leading a slowdown in productivity, less 
growth, and reducing incentives for innovation ==> A VICIOUS CIRCLE (a 
dynamic loss). 
e. Supply	Chains	
A further consideration, when assessing the economic consequences of altering 
trade arrangements, is that most modern industries, especially complex 
manufactured products such as vehicles or electrical goods, employ extended supply 
chains with many stages of fabrication carried out by different firms. Many of these 
are international, linking firms (or branches of firms) across countries. The 
emergence of modern information and communication technologies (the internet) 
has played an important role in supporting extended supply chains.    
One indication of the importance of supply chains is the high proportion of 
intermediate inputs in industry costs shown in Figure 2 (this is an average, for many 
individual sectors the share of intermediate inputs is even higher).  
The successive stages of these supply chains involve specialist relationships 
between producers. This is particularly true when – as is the case in many industries 
today – goods and services are highly differentiated. Firms then have to make 
relationship-specific investments (for example designing products and distribution 
systems) to suit their main customers. This in turn creates a number of challenges 
that do not arise for the case of trade in standardised products. Direct ownership 
may be preferred over a market relationship in order to internalise the high 
transaction costs associated with complex products. Where direct ownership is not 
possible then goods are delivered subject to a contract. This is dependent upon legal 
institutions to ensure that the contract is enforced. 
There has thus been is a shift in the nature of trade. Nowadays international 
exchange no longer consists largely of raw materials and finished goods and 
services but also to a large extent of goods at various stages of fabrication and 
services that input into production processes. Trade is supported by a complex 
supporting web of business relationships both within and between firms.  
This has a number of economic consequences: 
 Current patterns of trade, both domestic and international, are the cumulative 
outcome of  past investments – not just in fixed capital such as plant and 
machinery, but more importantly in intangible capital such as patents, 
business processes and employee training. 
 Much international trade, especially in sophisticated manufactured products, 
is based on intra-regional supply chains, strengthened by the relatively close 
legal and cultural affinities of neighbouring nations as well as comparatively 
low transportation costs. Thus, while the UK, sends a substantial volume of 
manufactured exports to the United States, we also use as inputs to these 
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exports a substantial volume of manufactured intermediate and capital goods 
imports from the rest of Europe. 
 For other products, where stages of production rely on unskilled or semi-
skilled labour, supply chains may extend inter-regionally from lower wage 
developing economies to higher wage developed economies. Arguably this 
has substantially altered the distributional impact of free trade arrangements, 
with reduced tariff barriers resulting in greater international competition in the 
supply of unskilled and semiskilled labour and falling real wages and 
employment in the developed world. 
 As a consequence of the greater complexity and internationalisation of 
production, trade agreements are themselves becoming increasingly 
complicated and difficult to execute. The WTO’s Doha round, its most recent 
effort at global reduction in barriers to trade, broke down in 2008 with 
particular problems in reaching agreement on agricultural trade and in 
bridging the opposing interests of developing and developed nations. 
Subsequent efforts at agreeing trade arrangements have been regional, 
including the efforts at reducing non-tariff barriers within the EU single market.  
 Arguably, for the many industrial sectors characterised by imperfect 
competition, taking full advantage of the potential static and dynamic gains 
from the international organisation of production requires low barriers to trade, 
especially at regional level. 
This also means that the trade patterns we see today are in large part the outcome 
of past investment in trading relations. Manufacturers develop international networks 
of suppliers and design their production processes around co-operation with their 
principal partners. Governments also invest, in trade agreements to reduce trade b 
arriers and in the systems and processes to manage remaining tariffs and checks on 
compliance with regulation and standards.  Taking all this into consideration, means 
first that changes in trade take a considerable amount of time to fully respond to 
shocks (such as new trade arrangements). This means that the benefits of the EU 
single market will not disappear overnight, but continue for many years to come 
(although the introduction of lengthy process of border inspection to replace mutual 
recognition would have an immediate impact on costs of production). It also means 
that that benefits of re-orientating trade patterns, e.g. to greater trade with North 
America, will  take a long time to come through, with a very slow build up of 
investment in new supply chains. The worst outcome would be a disorderly or even 
hostile departure from the EU, disrupting existing supply chains, because there 
would be no compensating benefits from trade agreements outside of the EU for 
some years to come. 
The past investment in existing trade relationships is a principal reason why the 
trade impact of a rapid Brexit will be costly. The trade impact of a slow and managed 
Brexit carried out over several years will be very different, allowing existing 
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investments to be maintained and for new investments to be made and resulting in 
comparatively low costs to the UK and very possibly substantial net economic gain. 
f. Examples	of	individual	industries:	motor	cars	and	financial	services	
Our conference of Dec 9th, 2016 offered detailed discussion of two individual 
industries, motor cars and financial services. These two industries also illustrate 
issues that can affect other sectors: the international nature of supply chains and the 
importance of local ‘agglomeration’ effects.. 
Motor production has been a UK success story over the past decade, with the 
volume of exports more than doubled 2005-2015. 80% of this output (1.2 million 
vehicles) is exported, amounting to 12% of the value of all UK exports. 57% of car 
exports go to EU. Even more cars (2.2 million) were imported or taken from stock, 
but the UK has more of the  premium higher unit value end of market. 12% of car 
exports go to emerging markets.  
UK car manufacturers are the highest productivity in Europe and employ about 
800,000 people including in supply and distribution. They have achieved strong 
productivity growth (unlike rest of UK economy), with several plants operating 24/7 
using three shifts a day. 
The average UK content of a UK made car has risen slowly from 30% to 40% over 
the past six or seven years. The UK car industry is a primary example of the 
international nature of modern supply chains. Car companies work with primary first 
line suppliers who serve as  ‘module integrators’ i.e. sourcing and bringing together 
individual compnents. Parts of a UK made car can cross borders five or six times in 
the course of production. The UK is also a major exporter of car parts e.g exports of 
engines 2.5 million per year (a large proportion then exported for assembly in the 
EU). All this is based on substantial recent and continuing investments in supply 
chains. 
Davies et. al. (2014) report information on source of car parts for UK industry – 27% 
Germany, 10% France, 31% other EU, 9% Japan, 3% Turkey, 4% China,  20% Rest 
of the World.5 The car industry is global but with regional concentration. If the UK is 
faced with tariffs on exports to and imports from the EU for cars and car parts then 
clearly this will have an impact on the profitability of existing production 
arrangements, raising the question of whether major manufacturers might transfer 
production to factories within the EU. According to David Bailey, presenting at our 
conference, the investments at most risk of closure between 2018 and 2024 are 
likely to be those of  Honda and Toyota m because they already have relatively low 
margins and profitability and are operating below full capacity. Mini, Nissan and 
                                            
5 Davies, P., Holweg, M., Hugget, N., Schramm, S., & Tran, Y. (2014). Growing the automotive supply 
chain: Assessing the upstream sourcing potential. Automotive Council UK. 
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Vauxhall UK plants much more successful though the possibility of moving 
production to EU will still be considered. The niche luxury brands Jaguar-Land Rover, 
Bentley and Aston Martin are very unlikely to move. A range of factors will go into 
decision, not just costs, for example the time and trouble of applying ‘rules of origin’ if 
the UK is out of the European customs union and establishing conformity with 
national or EU regulations will be important considerations. 
Industry needs single market, customs union (or at least special rules of origin) and 
rules on hiring skilled workers from the EU (currently around 5000 critical skilled 
vacancies in UK car industry, one in ten workers from another EU country). The EEA 
is more than just a free-trade area, it is about access to the single market, within it 
there is a regulatory agreement, for example the mutual recognition of conformity 
assessment so that a car that is made in country that is part of that deal is not 
subject to technical inspections if it is sold in another country. An outcome without a 
tailored low tariff and mutual recognition and conformity with standards will be 
problematic for car industry. In the past the UK has been very successful at shaping 
EU regulations to ensure did not disadvantage UK car manufacturers, but this will be 
more difficult going forward. 
Financial services are another UK success story. Not only are financial services a 
major employer they also, through the wholesale services provided in London, make 
a major contribution to UK trade (Table 3).  
Table	3:	The	Trade	Contribution	of	the	City	
2015, £bn Credits Debits Balance 
Fund management 5.4 0.9 4.4 
Securities dealers – trading income (cfts) 6.2 0.1 6.1 
Monetary financial institutions – cfts 18.5 2.9 15.6 
Monetary financial institutions - interest spreads 7.1 2.2 4.9 
Baltic exchange for shipping (provisional data) 0.3 0.0 0.3 
Other financial services 13.3 2.4 10.9 
Life and general insurance 10.2 0.0 10.2 
Reinsurance and insurance services 2.7 0.1 2.5 
Law, accounting and management consulting 17.1 7.0 10.1 
Total 80.7 15.8 64.9 
Notes: Authors calculations from Pink Book 2016, Sections 3.4, 3.5 and 3.8 
cfts = commissions, fees and trading spreads  
Note from Table 3 that one third of the City of London trade balance come from the 
commissions, fees and spreads (cfts) associated with trading in foreign exchange, 
security and derivative markets. Much of  ‘other financial services’ – for example 
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clearing (trade guarantees) and securities settlement – are also associated with 
trading. The other main activities are bank deposit taking; bank credit, insurance and 
reinsurance; law and management consulting and (a smaller contribution, less than 
one tenth of the trade balance) fund management.  
The impact of Brexit on trade in financial services was addressed in short 
presentations at our conference by Michael Mainelli and Alistair Milne. It is clear from 
close examination that ‘passporting’ is a much less important issue for the future of 
financial services than much press discussion has suggested. 
Some have argued that the loss of EU ‘passporting rights’ on the City of London 
would lead to a substantial loss of export revenue. One widely cited example is  the 
Oct, 2016 report of City UK/ Oliver Wyman, which found that 40-50% of EU-related 
activity (approximately £18-20bn in revenue) and up to an estimated 35,000 jobs 
could be at risk, if the UK was to exit the EU without any arrangements for 
recognising the right of UK institutions to continue selling financial services to EU 
customers.6 
It is difficult to square this City UK/. Oliver Wyman analysis with the official balance 
of payments statistics shown in Table 3. UK trading and most banking and insurance 
services involves clients coming to London e.g. to execute trades, to deposit or 
borrow money or to take out insurance. Since OECD rules preventing the 
introduction of capital controls will apply to both the UK and to all EU countries after 
Brexit, clients will still be able to come to London to access these financial services, 
even those in Euro, and certainly those in dollars, Yen, sterling or minor currencies 
such as Australian, Canadian and New Zealand dollars, regardless of any trade 
agreements with the EU. 
If the UK fails to maintain ‘passporting rights’ for UK based firms this would have a 
substantial impact on the ability to provide some financial services across the EU. 
This is an issue for two main groups of City firms: (i) that part of the asset 
management industry which serves retail or smaller institutional clients in other EU 
countries; and (ii) banks of non-EU countries that have established subsidiaries in 
London in order to provide pan-European banking and foreign exchange services to 
their domestic corporate clients.  
While an exact figure for export earnings for these firms cannot be computed from 
the statistical sources used to compile Table 3, a very generous estimate would be 
around two fifths of asset management (£2bn) and around one tenth of the earnings 
of monetary financial institutions (£2.5bn). It is difficult to understand, given this total 
figure of total revenues threatened by loss of passporting of  £4.5bn, how there could 
                                            
6 City UK/ Oliver Wyman. (2016). The impact of the UK’s exit from the EU on the UK-based financial 
services sector.- executive summary. Retrieved from http://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-
wyman/global/en/2016/oct/Brexit_POV.PDF  
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possibly be an overall revenue loss of £18bn. The Oliver Wyman figures seem to be 
an order of magnitude – I.e. ten times – too large (possibly reflecting the fact that 
their client and co-author was the City lobbying group City UK).  
More realistic analysis of the impact of Brexit on the City of London have been 
provided by Singham (2016) and Reynolds (2016).7 As they point out there are many 
myths about financial services trade in the EU. Most importantly despite great efforts 
by the European Commission to promote a single market in financial services there 
is at present very little cross-border trade in retail financial services. It is of course 
possible that in future decades such cross-border retail financial services activity will 
grow in importance and the UK being outside of the EU will not participate in this 
growth. 
Another somewhat exaggerated issue is the potential move of Euroclearing from 
London to the continent. While EU authorities, on grounds of ensuring financial 
stability, may insist on all Euro denominated ‘clearing’ (mutual guarantees on the 
completion of security and derivatives trades) taking place in Euro area financial 
centres, this will of itself make little difference to the cost-competitiveness of London 
as a financial centre. As Mainelli argues in our conference, the rise of the City of 
London as a financial centre since 1945 is based on a wide number of competitive 
advantages, including language, infrastructure, supply chains and human capital. 
This agglomeration of activity has been self-reinforcing, further investments in 
London to take advantage of its competitive advantage over other international 
financial centres reinforcing those competitive advantages.  
A more substantial issue for the City of London, and indeed for the motor 
manufacturing industry and other sectors, are potential restrictions on the ability to 
bring in skilled labour from around the EU to work in the UK. The City of London has 
a very international workforce. Some EU citizens working in financial services in 
London are feeling that their future in the UK is uncertain and as a result may decide 
to leave the UK. 
An argument suggesting that Brexit will favour UK financial services, made by both 
Singham and Reynolds, is release from the constraints on UK financial services from 
pan-European financial regulation. There are many examples where regulation 
written to work across 28 jurisdictions limits activities that would be possible under a 
more permissive national regime. While the subject merits much closer examination 
than we are able to give to it, it is certainly possible that in order to encourage 
innovation – e.g. in newly emerging technology based competition for banks and 
                                            
7 Singham, S. A. (2016). Brexit and Financial Services. Retrieved from 
https://lif.blob.core.windows.net/lif/docs/default-source/default-library/post-brexit-briefing-financial-
services-september-2016-pdf.pdf?sfvrsn=4 ; Reynolds, B. (2016). A Blueprint for Brexit: The Future of 
Global Financial Services and Markets in the UK. Retrieved from http://www.politeia.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/Barnabas-Reynolds-A-Blueprint-for-Brexit-2.pdf  
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insurance companies – the UK may benefit from being outside of the existing 
framework of EU financial regulation. 
Overall it seems that the threat posed to the UK’s financial services by Brexit has 
been greatly exaggerated. Also and pertinently, given the relatively unimportance of 
passporting for UK interests, it is very possible that once after Brexit trade 
negotiations begin in earnest the UK government will want to be in a position to 
concede on claims to recognise passporting of UK financial services firms in order to 
extract some other concession from the EU to benefit a different UK industry. 
g. Estimates	of	Static	and	Dynamic	losses/gains	from	Brexit	
Given this wide range of contributing factors, is should come as no surprise that 
there is a wide range of estimates of the costs for the UK of replacing existing EU 
trading arrangements. Different modellers use a variety of modelling techniques and 
assumptions: some have utilised a microeconomic-based computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) or related approach, while others have taken microeconomic 
estimates of costs and inserted them into macroeconomic models. Some allow only 
for static impacts others allow for dynamic as well. Table 4, taken from a 2016 
Institute of Fiscal Studies (2016) paper covers a number of estimates:8  
The first impression from this table is the wide range of estimates of the long-run 
economic impact of Brexit, ranging from the 7.8 and 7.9 percent decline in GDP from 
the NIESR and the Centre for Economic Performance to the +4 percent increase in 
GDP from Economists for Brexit. Most estimates are negative, may are large and 
negative, with only two positive, a modest positive impact according to Open Europe 
and a larger positive impact according to the Economists for Brexit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
8 Emmerson, C., Johnson, P., Mitchell, I., & Phillips, D. (2016). Brexit and the UK’s public finances. 
Institute for Fiscal Studies Report, 116. Page 18. 
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Table	4:	Estimates	of	the	long‐run	economic	impact	of	Brexit	
Organisation Scenario Estimate 
(% GDP) 
Range Impacts modelled 
CEP (LSE) Dynamic 
EEA/FTA 
–7.9 
 
(–6.3 to –9.5) 
 
Budget, trade, productivity 
Static EEA –1.3 N/A Trade only 
Static WTO –2.6 N/A Trade only 
HM Treasury EEA –3.8 (–3.4 to –4.3) Budget, trade, FDI, 
productivity 
 
FTA –6.2 (–4.6 to –7.8) 
WTO –7.5 (–5.4 to –9.5) 
OECD WTO/ FTA –5.1 (–2.7 to –7.7) Budget, trade, FDI, 
productivity, migration, 
regulation 
NIESR EEA –1.8 (–1.5 to –2.1) Budget, trade, FDI, 
FTA –2.1 (–1.9 to –2.3) 
WTO –3.2 (–2.7 to –3.7) 
WTO+ –7.8 N/A Adds productivity 
PwC/CBI FTA –1.2 N/A 
 
Budget, trade, FDI, regulation 
WTO –3.5 
Oxford 
Economics 
FTAa –2.0 (–0.1 to –3.9) 
 
Budget, trade, FDI, migration, 
regulation 
Open Europe FTA –0.8 to +0.6 
 
(–2.2 to 1.6) 
 
Budget, trade, migration, 
regulation 
Economists 
for Brexit 
WTO +4.0 N/A Budget, trade 
Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies, citation above. 
 
In fact there is much less discrepancy of view about the economic mechanisms than 
this first impression given by this table would suggest. There are two main reasons 
why these projections differ: 
 The first is whether they look only at static impacts arising from higher costs of 
trade or if they also allow for the further dynamic impacts on productivity 
growth and investment. As we have already argued dynamics effects are 
important determinants of trade volumes and the economic gains from trade. 
The experience of the UK car industry in the past decade, reviewed above, 
provides an excellent illustration, the initial advantages of car manufacturing in 
the UK have been reinforced by investment and efficiency gains as scale of 
operations has increased, leading to further productivity gains. While these 
dynamics are notoriously difficult to model, they can be expected to 
substantially increase either the gains or losses of Brexit, possibly by a factor 
of two or more. 9  
                                            
9 Interestingly, the economist best known for theoretical modelling of dynamic gains from trade, Paul 
Krugman, deliberately chose a model excluding such gains when he produced back-of-envelope 
calculations (of a GDP loss of 2% from Brexit) in June 2016. 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/06/12/notes-on-brexit/?_r=0 
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 The second is the assumptions made about the impact of Brexit on the costs 
of international trade.10 Take for example the positive +4% projection of the 
economic impact of Brexit from Economists for Brexit. Their modelling of the 
costs of trade allows only for tariff, not non-tariff, barriers to trade with the 
further assumption that the UK, once outside of the EU, is able to negotiate 
zero-tariff deals with all our trading partners around the world and hence 
substantially reduce overall costs of trade. Compare this with the negative 
forecasts of NIESR, the Centre for Economic Performance and HM Treasury 
take the opposite tack. These focus on non-tariff barriers assuming that the 
non-tariff barriers to trade with the EU increase substantially unless we remain 
in the EEA. So this is a comparison on apples with oranges, the different 
projections reflecting not so much the modelling but the different assumptions 
made about future costs of international trade (Brexit has little impact costs of 
trading with the EU and reduces trading costs overall v. Brexit has a major 
impact on the costs of trading with the EU and increases trading costs overall.) 
Whether the actual outcome is more extreme negative or the more positive 
economic projections from this table depends very much on how Brexit is 
implemented. The Economists for Brexit scenario, assuming non-tariff barriers are 
not increased by Brexit, is a plausible one provided we negotiate a deep and 
comprehensive trade agreement both between the UK and the EU, and between the 
UK and other countries such as Switzerland and the United States after Brexit, 
covering all the principal industries in which we engage in international trade, 
including our service industries and ensuring that they are not affected by non-tariff 
barriers.  
As we will discuss in Section 3, when we look at the institutional arrangements for 
international trade, such an outcome is achievable but it will take time and effort, we 
believe with good will an EU-UK trade deal will take around five years. The 
Economists for Brexit projection then becomes credible. 
The more negative projections assume instead a substantial increase in non-tariff 
barriers to trade with the EU. Two of these (those of the LSE Centre for Economic 
Performance and of NIESR) were presented at our conference of Dec, 2016. 
Focusing on the NIESR work, this (to simplify somewhat) assumes an increase in 
costs of trade with the EU, as a result of higher non-tariff barriers, equivalent to an 
average tariff of around 10% and as a result (‘ceteris paribus’ i.e. other things held 
constant) a fall in the value of UK trade with the EU of 50% and of overall UK trade 
                                            
E on10 The IFS attempt to summarise these assumptions under three main headings: EEA (meaning 
an arrangement similar to Norway in which the UK continuesto participate in the Single Market and 
possibly also customs union); FTA (meaning a tailored deep and comprehensive trade agreement 
between the UK and the EU which maintains some but not all the benefits of participation in the 
Single Market); and WTO (meaning that there is no arrangement with the EU other than that 
immediately obtainable from applying WTO rules). This three-way split however does not adequately 
capture the different forecasting assumptions. 
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with the rest of the world of around 25%. Their modelling is undertaken very carefully, 
allowing for the patterns of trade in intermediate as well as final goods and assuming 
relatively limited impact of free trade agreements on trade in services (Economists 
for Brexit appear to assume instead that future trade deals by the UK can 
substantially lower the costs of trade in services, but the little evidence we have from 
past free trade agreements seems to suggest that these do not have much impact 
on services exports).  
NIESR then employ their multicountry NIGEM model of the world economy to 
investigate further offsetting second round impacts, most notably a decline in sterling 
exchange rate which serves to boos t our exports and trade. The rather pessimistic 
NIESR projections are a credible outcome, assuming we pursue Brexit rapidly and 
fail to spend the years ahead negotiating a deep and comprehensive deal between 
the UK and the EU in order to prevent a substantial rise in non-tariff barriers to UK-
EU trade. 
Thus we see that the apparent divergence of views amongst different economic 
forecasters is, in reality, a difference in assumptions about the implementation of 
Brexit. Economists for Brexit assume that this is managed well and that we do not 
experience any substantial increase in costs of our external trade. Most other 
forecasters assume that implementation of Brexit is unable to avoid a substantial 
increase in costs of our external trade, primarily because we are unable to find a 
substitute arrangement that achieve the same lowering of non-tariff barriers for EU-
UK trade that is currently achieved through our participation in the EU Single Market. 
The key question is then what is required to manage Brexit well and avoid 
substantial increases in the costs of external trade. Our view, as we have made clear 
and discuss further in Section 3, is that preventing a rise in non-tariff barriers to UK-
EU trade will require several years of negotiations after the UK has left the EU. We 
assume that Economists for Brexit are a good deal more optimistic than we are on 
the time framew for such negotiation, believing that an effective deal between the UK 
and the EU to prevent a substantial increase in non-tariff barriers to trade(product 
standards, regulations etc.) can be sorted out comparatively quickly. But even if this 
can be done in say one or two years, detailed negotiations cannot begin until close 
to or even after the UK has left the EU. Therefore, if the positive outcome predicted 
by Economists for Brexit is to be achieved, there is no alternative to negotiating an 
interim period of continued membership of the Single Market for least a couple of 
years after March 2019 (the end of the Article 50 process).  
During this time the UK will one must assume be obliged to continue with both 
contributions to the EU budget and to accepting freedom of movement of labour. Our 
own view is that a five year period of interim participation in the Single Market will be 
needed, but even this is uncertain, so it would be unwise to impost any fixed time 
limit on this interim participation in the Single Market cannot. Of course if negotiation 
of a replacement deep and comprehensive free trade agreement can be completed 
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in much less than five years, then the interim arrangement can be ended relatively 
soon. 
By the same token, the predictions of NIESR, the LSE Centre for Economic 
Peformance and others seem unduly pessimistic. Provided an open-ended post-
Brexit interim participation in the Single Market is agreed, then there is no reason for 
non-tariff barriers to trade to rise to the extent that their projections assume. A 
tailored deep and comprehensive free trade agreement between the UK and the EU, 
covering all important non-tariff barriers to UK-EU trade, will mean that the costs of 
UK-EU trade do not arise anything like as much as these forecasts assume. 
Indeed it is very possible that our leaving the European Single Market and European 
Customs Union, could over time yield substantial economic benefits to the UK. To 
give one example, as we have already discussed, departure from the EU could be 
beneficial to UK financial services, allowing the the UK to tailor the regulation of this 
strong export sector to support international trade in financial services. A strong case 
can be made for the benefits of similar freedoms for trade in other agriculatural, 
industrial and service sectors.11  
 
  
                                            
11 See Singham, S. A. (2017). A Blueprint for UK Trade Policy. London. Retrieved from 
https://lif.blob.core.windows.net/lif/docs/default-source/default-library/170427-final-trade-
blueprintweb.pdf?sfvrsn=0  for an optimistic and largely persuasive account of the benefits of such freedpm for 
the UK to conduct its own trade arrangemetns; Singham though does not provide any detailed assessmentof the 
time scale for reaping these benefits which could be relatively slow.  
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3. The	Institutional	Arrangements	
This section reviews the institutional arrangements that govern international trade, 
and the extent to which these constrain UK trade arrangements after leaving the EU. 
The overall conclusion is that, in the longer term, the institutions of trade negotiations 
such as the world trade organisation WTO place little constraint on our policy 
choices; but there are difficult issues of transition and implementation, especially in 
relation to non-tariff barriers to trade and trade in agricultural products and services. 
These concerns, and the need for given and take in negotiations, mean that the 
replacement of our existing trade relations with new trade agreements, both with the 
EU and with other countries, cannot be undertaken quickly.   
a. Types	of	Trade	Barrier	
 
1. Tariffs 
Tariffs are the best-known form of trade barrier. A tariff allows the government of an 
importing country to impose a tax on imports (either ad valorem, i.e. percentage of 
value, or specific, so many pounds per litre). Tariffs raise revenue, and also raise the 
price in the home market, protecting domestic producers who compete with the 
importers. 
As well as tariffs, there are export subsidies (subsidising exporters). These cost the 
government revenue, but again protect home production at the expense of foreign 
competitors. 
2. Quotas/Voluntary Export Restraints 
A quota is a physical limit on the amount of a good that can be imported (for example, 
no more than 10,000 litres of whisky). In a market economy, the quota also raises 
the price to consumers at home, and protects local competitors. However, normally 
the revenue from the quota goes to the importing firm (unless the quota is rationed), 
so an importing government would usually prefer to impose a tariff, which raises 
revenue, rather than a quota. 
Some countries (traditionally India during the years of the ‘license Raj’) also imposed 
quotas on exports. These tended to be allocated to well-connected companies, 
giving them rents at the expense of consumers and the overall economy. Economist 
Jagdish Bhagwati was well-known for his criticism of the license Raj. 
A VER is an agreement between an importing country and a group of foreign 
exporters, that they would limit sales to the importing country. A classic case used to 
be the agreements between European and/or North American governments and 
Japanese car manufacturers over the years, to limit numerically car imports from 
Japan. This protects production in Europe/North America, and led to Japanese 
producers setting up local manufacturing plants in the importing countries. The VERs 
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also led Japanese manufacturers to increase quality (and hence price) of the cars 
they exported to Europe/North America. VERs were outlawed by the WTO 
agreement of 1994, but are believed to continue to exist (just not being reported). 
3. Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) 
Countries often impose local standards and regulations to prevent goods which are 
dangerous, polluting or incompatible (for example with local electricity supply 
systems) from being sold. A degree of such protection is economically sensible in a 
world where externalities (such as pollution) exist, and where consumers may not be 
perfectly informed.  
TBTs can impose an unintentional barrier to trade. In addition, a legitimate TBT can 
often be tweaked by a government as a form of covert protection: for example, 
Japan was known for many years for insisting on testing each batch of certain 
American electronic goods (while only testing Japanese firms every few months). In 
the 1980s, France insisted on all imported video players being tested at a centre in 
(inland) Poitiers. Arguably this had far more to do with protection of local producers, 
rather than banning dangerous video players.12 
4. Producer Subsidies 
Instead of taxing imports or subsidising exports, it is also possible to subsidise 
production (or to provide a producer with financial support to bear ongoing losses). 
This was very common during the economic cris es of the 1970s (for example with 
the subsidies to British Leyland or British Steel). Arguably the winding down of such 
support was a major way in which Britain’s economy was liberalised during the 
1980s. 13  
5. Tax/Environmental competition 
Companies may be given tax breaks – either specific to one firm or general to all 
firms – in order to attract inward investment. Again, when countries distort their tax 
regimes strongly in order to attract mobile investment (while raising taxes on less 
mobile firms or people) this is arguably a serious distortion to trade.  
                                            
12 An important form of TBT is the use of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards 
(SPS): in the case of plants and livestock technical barriers have to be put in place at 
times, to prevent the spread of diseases. These usually consist of an absolute ban 
on certain products leaving one country (often a developing country) for another.  
 
13 In former Communist countries after 1990, a key element of the restructuring and 
privatisation process of industries was to ‘harden’ firms’ budget constraints, so that 
they could no longer expect to be bailed out if they made losses. 
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A parallel situation is where a country deliberately undercuts its rivals in 
environmental standards, setting up as a pollution haven. 
6. State purchasing policy 
Not all purchasing is done on the competitive market. Where governments (or large 
companies, often linked to the government) engage in discriminatory purchasing 
(favouring local producers), this again inhibits trade. Increased transparency of 
bidding and purchasing can be seen as a pro-trade policy, as can be policies to 
break up monopoly purchase arrangements. 
There are a number of other issues, or more relevance to developing andemerging 
markets which can affect the costs of foreign trade.14 If and when the UK comes 
round to negotiating free trade arragnements with India, China, Brazil and other 
emerging markets these issues will also have to be covered in free trade 
negotiations. 
b. Global	Trade	Agreements:	The	World	Trade	Organization	
The WTO was set up in 1995, as a result of the Marrakesh Agreement, and replaced 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, after the Uruguay Round of global 
trade negotiations. 
The WTO currently has 164 members, while another 20 countries are observers. 
There are 6 agreements associated with the WTO: 
1. The Agreement establishing the WTO. 
2. Agreements on Trade in Goods, and the Trade Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMS). 
3. Services – the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
4. The Agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). 
5. Dispute Settlement (DSU) 
6. Reviews of governments’ trade policies. 
Principles of International Trade under the WTO. 
1. Non-Discrimination: 
                                            
Border delays/bureaucracy. In developing countries, particularly, crossing a border can be a lengthy 
process, involving long queues, large amounts of paperwork and often bribes. Poor border 
infrastructure. Lack of currency convertibility. Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment. Poor legal and 
contracting systems in importing countries may deter foreign firms from investing. Lack of intellectual 
property protection is often cited as a problem for investors in China, for example.FDI may require the 
international movement of key staff, so restrictive visa systems will also constitute a barrier to FDI. 
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a. The Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Principle. If country A offers 
concessions on trade in a certain product to one country, it must 
extend it to all WTO members. 
b. National Treatment (NT). Any good which complies with a country’s 
internal laws should be allowed access to the market, regardless of 
where it is produced.  
c. Note that regional trade agreements are an exception to MFN.  
Meanwhile, NT is often seen as still allowing far too much scope for 
regulatory protection (hence the EU Single Market, and an increasing 
number of international agreements, supplement it with harmonisation 
or mutual recognition – see below). 
2. Reciprocity. Countries trade concessions with each other. 
3. Binding and enforceable commitments. If a country breaches a commitment 
later on, this can lead to the Dispute Settlement procedures being called upon. 
4. Transparency – backed by periodic reviews of each member’s policies. 
5. Safety valves (there are exceptions to the above rules, for example to deal 
with animal or plant health emergencies). 
c. Regional	Trade	Agreements	
Free	Trade	Areas	(FTAs)	
An FTA consists of an agreement between a group of countries to abolish tariffs and 
quotas on trade between them. Hence, there is free trade within the FTA. However, 
countries in an FTA set their own tariffs and quotas with third party countries. 
A few points about FTAs.  
a) An FTA is not necessarily good for economic welfare. Consider, for example, 
NAFTA. The United States abolishes tariffs on manufactured imports from 
Mexico. However, importers from Brazil still pay tariffs. Hence, there is trade 
creation (trade between the USA and Mexico increases, allowing the two 
countries to specialise in the goods they are comparatively better at 
producing). But there is also trade diversion (Mexican exporters to the USA 
replace Brazilian ones, which may be lower cost). 
b) Trade creation is likely to outweigh trade diversion (i.e. an FTA is ‘good’) if 
countries are ‘natural trading partners’ (i.e. they are situated close to one 
another), and if members specialise in relatively similar goods. Hence, an FTA 
of the USA and Canada (both wealthy countries) is less controversial than 
one including Mexico. 
c) Because countries in an FTA set their own tariffs against third parties, this 
leads to problems. In theory, if Canada had low tariffs on Brazilian imports, 
but the USA had high tariffs, Brazilians could sell their produce to Canada and 
then reroute it to the USA. This could cause the FTA to break down. To avoid 
this happening, an FTA requires complex Rules of Origin. For example, 
Canadian exports to the USA require certification that more than x% of the 
value added in production took place in Canada. Otherwise, they have to pay 
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a tariff.  ==> Rules of Origin mean that there is a bureaucratic cost to 
trade within a Free Trade Area. 
d) Because a country in an FTA can set its own trade policy with third parties, 
membership of one FTA does not preclude membership of another FTA. 
For example, when Britain was in the old EFTA agreement (prior to joining the 
EEC), it was able to have its own free trade agreements with Commonwealth 
countries. These ended when we joined the EEC. 
A	Customs	Union	(CU).	
Members of a CU abolish internal tariffs and quotas, but also charge a 
common external tariff. The EU is a Customs Union (among other things).15 
Points about CUs include: 
a) Trade within a CU is probably freer than that within an FTA, because there 
is no need to police rules of origin.  
b) However, members of a CU cannot strike individual trade agreements 
with third countries. For example, a country cannot belong to a CU with 
one set of countries and an FTA with another set of countries (unless the 
CU as a whole joined the FTA). Britain had to abandon its trade 
agreements with Commonwealth countries when it joined the EEC 
(although the EEC did strike some trade deals with former colonies). 
c) The same issues of trade creation and trade diversion apply to CUs as to 
FTAs. A CU is more likely to be beneficial if it is formed between ‘natural 
trading partners’ of similar income levels. 
d) Because a CU coordinates external tariffs centrally, it has more bargaining 
power against the rest of the World. This means the CU has more power 
to act as a cartel, manipulating prices at the expense of third party 
countries. 
e) On the other hand, a CU may have more bargaining power to force large 
countries to the table for a mutual trade deal. 
f) Being outside a local CU can be disadvantageous, precisely because the 
CU has increased bargaining power against its neighbours. 
d. Reducing	non‐tariff	barriers	through	rules	on	market	access	
Trade negotiators have increasingly focused upon non-tariff barriers to trade 
(see previous section).  A major impediment to trade is the application of rules 
that – intentionally or unintentionally – deny access to goods or services, or 
make such access expensive in terms of time, product modifications and 
legal/bureaucratic costs. 
 
                                            
15 Strictly, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_Customs_Union   some territories of the 
EU are not part of the customs union (e.g. Heligoland), some territories and countries outside of the 
EU are in the customs union (e.g. Monaco, Jersey) 
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Some major disputes (for example between the USA and the EU on 
Genetically Modified Organisms) end up in the courts of the WTO. Usually, 
however, ‘deeper integration’ agreements aim at dealing with these disputes 
more swiftly. 
  
One argument is that, if a company wants to export to a particular market, say 
the EU, it need only produce those goods it wants to export in a way which 
comply with EU rules. So, arguably, if Britain exports 15% of its GDP to the 
EU, it need only apply EU regulations to 15% of goods it produces. 
However, this overstates the degree of flexibility manufacturers or service 
providers have in producing for different markets. Moreover, a key issue is 
trust. If a regulator (say for the EU Single Market) does not trust that all 
goods produced within a particular country are compliant with EU standards, it 
will inevitably ask for far more regular testing and more exhaustive paperwork 
on any goods exported. This is potentially very costly. So in reality, if a 
country wants easy access for its exports to a foreign market, it needs a 
mutual agreement with its export market. This is particularly important for 
some services exports, where non-tariff/regulatory/red tape barriers are more 
important relative to other forms of protection. 
 
Since the referendum, a number of contributors to the UK policy discussion 
have raised the possibility of obtaining ‘access to the EU single market’ under 
a free trade agreement with the EU, without being a ‘member of the EU single 
market’ e.g. like the EEA agreement for Norway and Iceland, hence obtaining 
free trade in goods and services with the EU but without accompanying 
obligations on free movement of people. The prospective free trade 
agreement with Canada, CETA, now agreed but subject to parliamentary 
ratifications, is put forward as an example of a country outside the EU 
obtaining such access. 
 
In reality, for countries that are not members of the EU single market, access 
must be agreed on a product by product basis for different goods and services 
and through the weaker process of mutual recognition of standards rather 
than centralised harmonisation of standards. While there is certainly scope, 
should the UK not remain a member of the EU single market, for agreeing 
access without non-tariff barriers for many categories of EU-UK trade, this is 
not equivalent to membership. 
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Two approaches to  agreement on market access: 16 
a) Harmonisation of Standards. 
Many of the rules within the EU Single Market are harmonised – in other 
words, laid down specifically by the Commission, and adopted by law in all 
member states. While this does result in a complicated set of rules, it is 
arguably a lot easier for firms to apply than if 28 states (plus Norway and 
Switzerland) all had their own, quite separate standards. 
 
Harmonised standards have advantages. Disputes are avoided. One set 
of paperwork for companies wishing to sell to all EU and associated 
markets is much simpler than having several. Regulatory games between 
member countries are largely avoided. 
 
Criticisms are that the system potentially gives excessive power to the 
Commission (and to industry groups advising the Commission), although 
the EU Parliament and Council of Ministers have oversight. 
 
In addition, a harmonisation system results in a ‘one size fits all’ approach. 
Different countries have different priorities. Moreover, the harmonised 
regulations are often seen as part of an excessively bureaucratic culture. A 
study by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, found that EU 
regulation cost British industry around £8.6-9.4 billion in 2010, although 
the Taxpayers’ Alliance and Eurosceptic Think-Tank Open Europe have 
higher cost estimates.17  
 
b) Mutual Recognition of Standards 
Rather than have a central body setting standards for all countries, it can 
be simpler for countries to agree to accept each other’s standards as 
acceptable for access. If goods produced in country A meet the local 
regulator’s standards, they are deemed fit for sale in country B, as long as 
goods produced in B to B’s regulator’s standards are likewise accepted in 
A.  
In the case of plant diseases, say, this would mean two countries 
accepting that the other’s procedures for disease prevention are adequate. 
In the case of health and safety, it would mean accepting that each 
country has satisfactory procedures for ensuring that goods are not 
carcinogenic. 
 
                                            
16 For more details, see Maskus and Wilson’s (2001) World Bank study: Quantifying the Impact of 
Technical Barriers to Trade, Michigan University Press. 
17 A comparison of estimates is available on https://fullfact.org/news/cost-eu-can-we-count-express-
estimates/. ‘Cost of the EU: Can we count on Express estimates?’ 
A report by Open Europe on the ‘Top 100 costliest EU regulations’ is available on 
http://openeurope.org.uk/intelligence/britain-and-the-eu/100-most-expensive-eu-regulations/. 
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Mutual recognition agreements can be quicker to reach than 
harmonisation, and are also less centralised, giving more scope to 
individual states to choose their own priorities. On the other hand, mutual 
recognition requires a dispute-settling authority independent of the 
countries’ governments. This is the basis of the Trans Pacific Partnership  
and Canada-Europe Trade Agreement agreements, and of the proposed 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement. Arguably 
these agreements, while more decentralised, are also less democratic 
than the traditional EU harmonisation approach, since they hand ultimate 
power to ‘unelected judges’. 
 
A number of economic studies have analysed whether there are biases in 
standard-setting under mutual recognition: in particular, whether a ‘race to 
the bottom’ in standards is likely to occur. While early studies found this 
was unlikely, more recent papers have found that, in the cases of i) 
environmental pollutants and ii) where a good is overwhelmingly exported 
in one direction, there will indeed be a bias towards undermining 
standards.18 In short, compared to the EU approach of harmonisation, 
mutual recognition which will be required in any future deep and 
comprehensive trade agreements signed by the UK, may tend to favour 
corporate interests rather than environmental or health and safety lobbies. 
 
Existing trade arrangements with the EU. 
  
We can distinguish the EU’s various trade agreements, in approximate order of 
closeness of integration as follows: 
1. Full membership of the Single Market. Implies free movement of goods, 
services, capital and labour.  
2. Membership of the European Economic Area (Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein).  These adopt EU Single Market legislation, except for certain 
exclusions (agriculture and fisheries). 
3. Switzerland. Strong participation in the Single Market subject to bilateral 
agreements but remaining outside of the Customs Union 
                                            
18 See for example Costinot, A. (2008). A comparative institutional analysis of agreements on product standards. 
Journal of International Economics, 75(1), 197–213; and Edwards, T. H. (2009). Tariffs, Horizontal Regulatory 
Standards and Protection against Foreign Competitors. Global Economy Journal, 9(2). 
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4. Turkey has a separate Customs Union agreement with the EU (since 1995), 
but is not a full member of the Single Market. Its longstanding application for 
accession is showing few signs of progress 
5. Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements or DCFTA with Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia (2014). 
6. Deeper Trade Agreements that go substantially beyond WTO (e.g. with South 
Korea, 2011,deals with Canada and with Japan are now at final stage of 
agreement. A TTIP with the US, is also being pursued, thought the atitudes of 
the current US administration put this in doubt.). 
A DCFTA means membership of a free trade area with the European Union (no 
tariffs with the EU), though DCFTA members are able to set their own external tariffs 
with third parties, including joining other FTAs. In the cases of Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia, membership of a DCFTA does not, therefore, preclude them from forming 
FTA agreements with Russia or other CIS countries, although these countries could 
no longer join the Eurasian Economic Union (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan). 
Since it is a FTA, imports from Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia will still be subject to 
Rules of Origin, which is in effect a barrier to free movement of goods and services 
with Europe. There is no commitment to free movement of people.  However, the 
three DCFTA states have undertaken to implement all EU product market rules – in 
return for which there will be no further market access barriers to their exporters 
selling to Europe. Note that moving from old GOSTs to EU standards will take time 
and be costly, but this will improve export prospects for these countries across the 
World (since their exports will be seen as complying with the standards of advanced 
Europe). 
There are a number of aspects of the DCFTAs which could be attractive to the UK in 
determining its future trade relations with Europe: (i)No market access barriers; (ii) 
No tariffs with Europe; (iii) No commitment to free movement of labour; and (iv) 
Freedom to sign FTAs with other countries outside Europe. 
However, UK exporters would face rules of origin red tape. Britain would be subject 
to rules set by the EU Commission with no say. Some companies (big polluters, for 
example) would undoubtedly campaign against a DCFTA. There is also no 
guarantee that Britain could achieve a DCFTA with the EU without making 
considerably more concessions than Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia have done. There 
may be difficulties in achieving WTO approval for any such agreement. 
d. Does	the	WTO	constrain	or	help	UK	trade	policies	after	Brexit?		
We can complete this section with a brief discussion of the extent to which the WTO 
rules may affect UK trade arrangements after Brexit. Much of this material is taken 
from the discussions at our Dec 2016 conference, both the presentation by Alan 
Winters and the closing panel discussion. But the summary and interpretations 
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provided here are own. We refer to our suggestions for further reading, for a fuller 
account of these issues.  
Perhaps the most important point is that membership of the WTO will after Brexit be 
the foundation for all our trade relations. Moreover it will be difficult to have serious 
negotiation with other countries outside of the EU until the relationship with the EU is 
more clarified (which as we argue is likely to take some years).  
The UK is a member of WTO, with rights and obligations that at present are 
determined and communicated by the EU on behalf on the UK. The WTO offers a 
well understood process, referred to as rectification, through which these rights and 
obligations can be restored to the UK. The UK will make formal proposal. This would 
then be submitted to WTO; the director-general circulates this and other countries 
have three months to object. If there are no objections after three months, this is 
formally accepted within the WTO schedule.  
There are two reasons why non-EU countries might have objection. First they may 
feel that a tariff of say 10% with the UK and separately of 10% with the EU is not 
quite the same thing as a 10% tariff when the UK is a member of the EU. Secondly 
there may well be concerns about agriculture, which is always a difficult challenge in 
trade negotiations. The most obvious problem relating to agriculture arises with what 
are known as ‘tariff rate quotas’ or TRQs. These reduces the amount of tariff paid, 
for a given country exporting to the EU upto an agreed quantity of exports. A 
prominent example is lamb from New Zealand, where a little over 200 tonnes can 
currently be exported tariff free each to the EU. 
The key issue is, how, post rectification will TRQs be determined and allocated 
between the UK and to EU? The outcome will then depend, critically, on future 
expectations for UK policy. If the UK, as some advocate, is expected to eliminate all 
tariffs on agricultural imports then any transfer of TRQs to the UK, rather than to the 
rest of the EU, will become valueless. On the other hand TRQs transferred to the EU 
which are then not fully used are also going to be resisted.  
Other issues that may affect rectification are subsidies (though unlikely to be a major 
issue because EU rules are much more constraining than WTO rules, most 
opportunities for substidy under WTO rules are not fully utilised); and rules on 
government procurement where devolvement to UK will be a cause of concern if 
there is any reason to believe that the UK will become more protectionist than it is 
under existing EU procurement rules. 
Finally the implications of WTO membership for a future deep and comprehensive 
free trade agreement between the UK and the EU need to be kept in mind. While 
WTO rules do support agreement on standards and regulations, for example GATT 
article XXIV supports conformity assessment procedures for mutual recognition, for 
example it recommends “Members shall accept [equivalent] sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures of other Members…”. But while the principal is clearly stated, there is no 
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formal mechanism (equivalent to the European Court of Justice in enforcing the rules 
of the European Single Market) so in practice substantial regulatory and product 
standard barriers can remain unaddressed.  
Another key point here is how little prescription there is in the WTO agreements on 
reducing barriers to trade in services.  Here we very much agree with the 
assessment of a UK Trade observatory briefing paper:19 “The EU Single Market for 
services may be imperfect but it goes a long way towards facilitating the exchange of 
services amongst members. Thus, Brexit will almost surely be associated with a 
deterioration in market access conditions for UK providers; however, the extent of 
that change is difficult to gauge for two reasons. First, applied services trade policies 
in the areas of cross-border trade, investment, and movement of people are typically 
more liberal than what the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
commitments would prescribe. Second, unlike for goods trade, there is no uniform 
EU services trade regime for suppliers from outside the EU. Hence, upon leaving the 
EU access to EU markets for UK service providers is likely to deteriorate in a way 
that differs across EU member states, sectors, and modes of supply.” 
What this quotation highlights is the challenge of replacing the benefits of the Single 
Market for trade in services. This is not to say that the UK cannot successfully 
engage in services trade outside of the EU, it already does especially in financial 
services and other business services. But services exports to the EU make an 
important contribution to UK trade and, unless and until a deep and comprehensive 
free trade agreement between the UK and the EU covering services is in place once 
any interim post-Brexit membership of the Single Market comes to an end, then UK 
services exports to the EU could be substantially reduced.  
e. A	deep	and	comprehensive	EU‐UK	Free	Trade	agreement?		
We complete this section by drawing together some ‘threads’ of the previous 
discussion both to make the case for the critical importance of a deep and 
comprehensive EU-UK Free Trade agreement and the substantial challenges 
involved in having this successfully negotiated.  
A first point to make is that there (despite the fantasies of many journalists) there is 
no ‘off the peg’ arrangement for EU-UK trade arrangements post-Brexit. We cannot 
just copy Norway (membership of the EEA except fishing), Switzerland (a sector by 
sectgor agreement), Turkey (customs union and some additional access to 
European markets e.g. in motor car manufacture). What ever replaces our 
membership of the Single Market will have to be tailored to the specific UK situation 
                                            
19 Borchert, I. (2016). Services trade in the UK: what is at stake? (Briefing Paper No. 6). 
Brighton, UK: University of Sussex. Retrieved from http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/65675/  
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and to the various interest groups both in the UK and in the EU that will be affected 
by the trade agreement. 
The severe challenges of negotiating agreements for agriculture cannot be avoided, 
both in terms of  external tariffs (taking account of the interests of many third 
countries currently exporting to the UK) and in terms of standard setting. 
While departure from the Customs Union seems a comparatively ‘easy win’ in terms 
of establishing greater freedom for the UK to conduct our own trade arrangements 
with third countries, this raises the difficult question of customs inspections at the 
Northern Ireland- Republic of Ireland border.  A solution is needed that keeps all 
parties happy. 
When leaving the Customs Union, special arrangements will still be needed to 
ensure that leaving the Customs union does not then result in an unacceptably high 
regulatory compliance burden in order to enforce rules of origin (the EU n when 
these are relatively low). 
The really difficult issues though arise in relation to non-tariff barriers, establishing on 
a sector by sector basis new arrangements that replace UK membership of the 
Single Market and appropriate enforcement mechanisms that support mutual 
recognition of standards and regulations and so avoid the need for extensive checks 
at the EU-UK frontier. In order to achieve this in a timely fashion, there would seem 
to be little alternative to accepting the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, in 
order that there is relatively quick agreement that in turn unlocks the economic 
benefits of the UK having freedom to make its own agreements on non-tariff barriers 
with third countries. 
Finally it must be emphasised that all these issues will need to be nailed down 
before there is a final agreement. Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. 
Recalling that there are 27 countries remaining in the EU, each with their own 
specific interests in international trade, it is inconceivable that this massive 
negotiating challenge can be undertaken in a few months. Judging by the experience 
of the Canadian and Japanese free trade arrangements with the EU, this will take 
several years. Assuming good will and a constructive approach on both sides (which 
means giving up the rather unhelpful political rhetoric that has emerged since the 
Brexit referendum) this can perhaps be done in five years. To assume much less 
would seem to be naively optimistic. Nor can the need for such a comprehensive 
agreement be ignored, unless there is political appetite to undergo a sharp decline in 
UK living standards (judging by the projections summarise in Section 2 of around 5-8% 
decline in UK GDP) and, moreover, mudding the water for similar trade agreements 
with third countries, in order to achieve a rapid but costly Brexit. 
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4. Descriptive	statistics	for	UK	international	trade.		
This section presents a table and number of charts, assembled from various sources, 
illustrating some prominent features of UK international trade. 
Table 5 below shows a breakdown of UK’s trade with Europe and with Non-
European countries. Using these 2014 figures, UK exports amounted to  816 UD$ bn. 
of which 511 US$ bn. were in goods and 305 UD$ bn. in services. European 
countries then accounted for more than half of UK exports in both goods and 
services, 291 and 160 US$ bn., respectively.   
Table	5:	Summary	of	UK	external	trade	in	2014	
    
VARIABLES (US$ bn)     Europe20 Non-
Europe 
 Total 
    
Exports of Services 160.2 144.7 304.9 
Exports of Goods 291.9 219.3 511.1 
Total Exports 452.0 364.0 816.0 
Imports of Services 112.2 71.8 184.0 
Imports of Goods 421.1 273.3 694.3 
Total Imports 533.2 345.1 878.3 
Total Net Trade  -81.3 29.1 -52.1 
Net Trade in Goods -129.2 -43.8 -173.0 
Net Trade in Services 48.0 72.9 120.9 
    
Note: This table shows UK’s trade volumes in Goods and Services in 2014 (US$ bn.) for European 
and Non-European countries.  Source: Comtrade database, calculations by authors. 
These figures, suggesting that Europe is more important than the rest of the world as 
an export market for the UK, contrast with widely cited 2015 data from the ONS 
showing relatively larger exports of goods and services from the UK to outside of the 
EU compared to exports to the EU. This discrepancy reflects several factors: first the 
                                            
20 Albania, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Austria, Armenia, Belgium, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Belarus, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Rep, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine 
38 
 
importance of UK exports to other European countries not in the EU, notably 
Switzerland and Norway, second the sharp appreciation of the dollar relative to the 
Euro in the course of 2014, third the exclusion of banking and of transport, travel and 
tourism from the ONS statistics for 2015, fourth somewhat higher growth between 
2014 and 2015 of output and imports in countries outside of Europe than in Europe. 
Table 5 also reveal that in 2014, UK imports of 878 US$ bn., of which 533 US$ bn. 
were from Europe and 345 US$ bn. from the rest of the world. The UK had an overall 
trade deficit of about 52 US$ bn. in 2014, consisting of a trade surplus in services of 
121 US$ bn. and a trade deficit in goods of 173 US$ bn.   
UK	Trade	in	Goods	
We next look at the breakdown of UK trade in goods, by individual country and 
sector. Figures 3 to 6 show country destinations, showing that a small number of 
destinations account for a relatively large proportion of overall trade (outside of 
Europe the US and China, the other major countries of Asia, and some of the large 
oil-exporters from the middle east; within Europe the larger members states in the 
EU and also Switzerland). This is the case both for exports and for imports. 
 
Note: Author calculation using the Office for National Statistics (ONS) data. 
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Note: Author calculation using the Office for National Statistics (ONS) data. 
 
Note: Author calculation using the Office for National Statistics (ONS) data. 
 0
5 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
30 000
35 000
Ge
rm
an
y
Fr
an
ce
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Re
pu
bl
ic
 of
 Ire
la
nd
Be
lg
iu
m
 &…
Sp
ai
n
Ita
ly
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Sw
ed
en
Po
la
nd
N
or
w
ay
De
nm
ar
k
Cz
ec
h R
ep
ub
lic
Au
st
ria
Fi
nl
an
d
Hu
ng
ar
y
Po
rt
ug
al
Ro
m
an
ia
Gr
ee
ce
£ m
ili
on
FIGURE 4: UK'S TOP EUROPEAN EXPORT 
MARKETS FOR GOODS IN 2015
EU Total: 131 £bn 
0.0
10000.0
20000.0
30000.0
40000.0
50000.0
60000.0
70000.0
Ge
rm
an
y
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Fr
an
ce
Be
lg
iu
m
 &…
Ita
ly
Sp
ai
n
N
or
w
ay
Re
pu
bl
ic
 of
…
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Po
la
nd
Sw
ed
en
Cz
ec
h…
De
nm
ar
k
Au
st
ria
Hu
ng
ar
y
Po
rt
ug
al
Fi
nl
an
d
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Ro
m
an
ia
£
m
i
l
i
o
n
FIGURE 5: UK'S TOP EUROPEAN IMPORT MARKETS 
FOR GOODS 2015
EU Total: 219.6 £bn
40 
 
Note: Author calculation using the Office for National Statistics (ONS) data.  
 
Figures 7 and 8 show a breakdown of both imports and exports of goods, by major 
industries in 2015.  Both imports and exports are dominated by manufactured goods, 
with a concentration in relatively few categories of manufactured goods: electrical 
and mechnical machinery; cars, aircraft and other road vehicles, and medicines, 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals. Combined together these categories of 
manufactures account for 54% of total imports and  59% of total exports.  
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FIGURE 6: UK'S TOP NON‐EUROPEAN IMPORT 
MARKETS FOR GOODS IN 2015
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FIGURE 7: UK’s Major Goods Imports  
 
Note: Author calculation using the Office for National Statistics (ONS) data.  
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FIGURE 8: UK’s Major Goods Exports 
.
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UK	Trade	in	Services	
Figure 9, taken directly from the 2016 Pink Book breaks down UK services exports. 
Figure 9: ONS 2016 Pink Book (Figure 6): UK exports of services, 2015 
 
Compared to the UK’s export of goods, there is a relatively large variety of services 
exports. Important sub-categories within other business services include: 
Advertising, market research and public opinion polling services; Architectural 
services; Accountancy, auditing, bookkeeping and tax consulting services; Business 
management and management consulting services; Engineering Services; and 
Scientific and other technical services including surveying (This statement is based 
on the more detailed breakdown of 2014 data in Table C5 of the Annex to the 
January 2016 ONS publication “International Trade in Services: 2014”). 
Figures 10 and 11, show a breakdown of services exports and imports by country for 
2014.    As in the case of goods trade, most exports and imports are with relatively 
few destinations, the USA, the major countries of Europe including Switzerland and 
Japan;  but  with relatively less trade with China and other middle income countries 
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in Asia (the UK services exports to Austrlia are approximately double those to China).  
A relatively large volume of imports of services from India, which we believe refelect 
outsourcing of IT and other business activities. 
Export	value	added	
Figures 12, 13 and 14 report sectoral export value-added for 2011, in US$ mn., 
using the GTAP database (a harmonised international trade database that also 
includes that allows calculation of the earnings of each sector after netting out 
imported intermediate inputs). Compare Figure 12 with the first two rows of our Table 
3 which shows that the gross value of manufactured exports (511 US$ bn.) is around 
70% larger than the gross value of service exports (304 US$ bn.). Netting out 
imported intermediate inputs to obtain a figure for value added for the UK economy, 
Figure 12 shows that in terms of income generation exports of services  -- at a little 
over $100 US$ bn. – are a little larger than exports of manufactures. This reflects the 
complex international supply chains in modern manufacturing.  
Figure 13 presents a more detailed breakdown of the same value added data, for 
individual subsectors of services. Around 60% of the value added in UK exports of  
services are in sector 54 business services n.e.c.) Sectors 52 and 53,, financial 
services n.e.c. and insurance account for a little over 20% of value added in UK 
exports of services. 
Figure 14 presents a similar breakdown of value added data for individual 
manufacturing sub-sectors.  Over 70% of value added in manufacturing exports is 
accounted for by five sectors, in order of importance: 33 (Chemicals-rubber, and 
plastics), 41 (Machinery and equipment n.e.c., 38 (Motor vehicles and parts), 39 
(Transport equipment n.e.c) and  40 (Electronic equipment). 
Tariffs	
Figure 15 reminds us that the period since the ending of World War II has been one 
of historically low tariffs, which as a trade-weighted average over all sectors, were 
reduced to nearly negligible levels through multilateral agreement (GATT and then 
the WTO).  Figure 16 and 17 show tht that some relatively high tariffs remain for 
trade in some particular goods with specific destinations, e.g. (re)export of rice to 
Japan and CIS countries. 
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Figures	for	UK’s	Services	Trade	
Note: Author calculation using Comtrade database. These include financial sector and travel 
services. 
Figure 11: UK’s Imports of Services, 2014 
Note: Author calculation using Comtrade database. These include financial sector and 
travel services 
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Figures	for	UK	Export	Value	Added	
 
Note: Author calculation using Gtap 2011 data for agriculture and minerals21. 
manufactures22, and services. 23 
                                            
21 1 Paddy rice, 2 Wheat, 3 Cereal grains, 4 Vegetables- fruit-nuts, 5 Oil seeds, 6 Sugar cane- sugar 
beet, 7 Plant-based fibers, 8 Crops, 9 Bovine cattle-sheep and goats- horses, 10 Animal products, 11 
Raw milk, 12 Wool- silk-worm cocoons, 13 Forestry, 14 Fishing. 
22 Electricity 43, Gas manufacture  distribution 44, Water 45, Construction 46, Trade 47, Transport 
nec 48, Water transport 49, Air transport 50, Communication 51, Financial services nec 52,  
Insurance 53, Business services nec 54, Recreational and other services 55, Public Administration - 
Defense -Education- Health 56,  Dwellings 57 
23 19 Bovine meat products 20 Meat products nec,  21 Vegetable oils and fats  22 Dairy products, 23 
Processed rice,  24 Sugar, 25 Food products nec, 26 Beverages and tobacco products,  27 Textiles, 
28 Wearing apparel, 29 Leather products, 30 Wood products, 31 Paper products- publishing, 32 
Petroleum- coal products, 33 Chemical*-rubber,-plastic products, 34 Mineral products nec, 35 Ferrous 
metals, 36 Metals nec, 37 Metal products, 38 Motor vehicles and parts, 39 Transport equipment nec, 
40 Electronic equipment, 41 Machinery and equipment nec, 42 Manufactures nec. 
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Note: Author calculation using Gtap 2011 data. Sector definitions in note to Figure 9
Note: Author calculation using Gtap 2011 data. Sector definitions in note to Figure 9.  
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Figures	on	Historical	Aggregate	Tariff	and	2011	Breakdown	
Note: Author calculation using CEPII data.  
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Note: Author calculation using Gtap 2011 data. 
 
Note: Author calculation using Gtap 2011 data.  
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s
Sectors
Figure 16: Import Tariffs  in the UK by Origin,  
2011 EU27
Other EU
NAFTA
India
China
Japan
Korea
Other Asia
0
50
100
150
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s
Sectors
Figure 17: UK's Export Tariffs by Origin, 2011
EU27
Other
EU
NAFTA
India
China
Japan
Korea
Other
Asia
 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions	
This briefing paper provides a summary of the research evidence together with basic 
institutional and factual information about the economic impact of changing the UK’s 
trade arrangements after Brexit. The material here draws on and summarises some 
of the discussion at a conference, hosted at Loughborough University London, 
Stratford East, on Dec 9th 2016, which was financed by the ESRC through their UK 
in a changing Europe initiative.   
While written by three active university researchers – who are therefore somewhat 
distant from the practicalities of business – our findings are remarkably similar to 
those reached recently by the Director General and Chief Economist of the 
Confederation of British Industry. In a  speech at the London School of Economics, 
on 6th July 2017, they argued the case for an open-ended transitional deal that will 
keep the UK inside of the Single Market and of the European Customs Union, until 
new post-Brexit trade arrangements with the EU are in place.24 
Alteration of UK trade arrangements is challenging. As in any exercise in economic 
policy analysis, there is plenty of room for disagreement. But disagreement should 
be a starting point for discussion, focusing on those assumptions – whether about 
the economic mechanisms of trade or the facts of trade – which lie behind these 
disagreements.  
We find (Section 4, Table 5) that trade with the EU and with other countries in 
Europe who are closely economically integrated with the EU is the large majority of 
UK external trade. It accounts for £452bn out of the total £816bn of UK exports of 
goods and services in 2014 and £533bn out of the total £878bn of UK imports of 
goods and services in 2014. While the UK engages in substantial trade with other 
countries, notably our exports of goods and services to the US (around one half of all 
our non-European exports) it is clear that a priority in creating new trading 
arrangements for the UK must be preventing a large increase in tariff and especially 
non-tariff barriers for trade with Europe. 
We discuss the institutional arrangements for UK trade and some of thechallenges of 
amending them (Section 3). This is a challenging and complex task involving multiple 
                                            
24 Fairburn, C., & Newton-Smith, R. (2017). “Eyes wide open”: the importance of a smooth transition 
to a new EU deal. CBI. Retrieved from http://www.cbi.org.uk/news/speech-eyes-wide-open-the-
importance-of-a-smooth-transition-to-a-new-eu-deal/  
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interest groups.  There is no ‘off the peg’ solution, rather it is necessary to negotiate 
with the EU and with other trading partners new deep and comprehensive free 
trading arrangements, with explicit provisions for each sector of international trade in 
both goods and in services. Moreover there is a difficulty challenge of sequyencing. 
With the EU remaining our major trading partner we will be unlikely to make progress 
on deals with other countries outside the EU until EU trading arrangements have 
been largely agreed; discussion even with the EU will  have to take into account the 
interests of manour discus different interest groups in the UK and in all the countries 
of the EU and so will themselves take years; and no detailed discussion with the EU 
can take place until after we have agreed our Article 50 terms of withdrawal. 
Moreover nothing is finally agreed until everything is agreed, including agreement in 
difficult areas such as agriculture and associated tariff quota agreements. Thus even 
EU trade deals will be a task of some years. 
Finally we have reviewed the economics of trade and the varying estimates of 
different economists on the trade and economic impact of altering the UK’s trading 
arrangements after Brexit. We show that the substantial variation of these estimates 
can be explained, almost entirely, by the assumptions made about non-tariff barriers 
to trade. The positive view of Economists for Brexit, with a long run increase in UK 
GDP of 4%, is based on an underlying and unstated assump[tion that non-tariff 
barriers for trade with Europe do not increase post-Brexit, something that can be 
achieved, but only if we have a long transition period of exactly the kind proposed by 
the CBI. The other more negative projections are based on the assumption that non-
tariff barriers to trade with the EU rise, but provided we engage properly in 
negotiation of a tailored deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU 
– a task that we think will take about five years once it begins – then these rises in 
barriers to trade can be avoided. In the meantime, to avoid high economic costs of 
Brexit, the UK will have to remain in the Single Market, and presumably therefore 
continue making contributions to the EU budget and accepting freedom of movement 
of labour. 
Departure from the European Customs Union can likely take place much earlier, 
ahead of a full agreement on non-tariff barriers (standards and regulations) though 
this too will have to deal with tricky questions, for example the Northern Ireland/ 
Republic of Ireland border and the application of rules of origin once we reach 
agreement on replacement tariffs with the EU. 
Both in theory and in practice the choices for future trade arrangements for the UK 
post-Brexit are clear, there is no sensible alternative to an extended transition 
arrangement that will last perhaps until 2024. 
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The final decision though must of course be political and political decision making 
can result in a different outcome. We believe that the political choices are best 
framed as in two dimensions – cost and time – as set out in Figure 1 of our executive 
summary. A sensible political process would ensure that commitment to Brexit, 
respecting the outcome of the referendum – was accepted on all sides, and would 
therefore make politically possible the choice of a slow but managed Brexit. 
Regrettably though we may be about to endure a national tragedy, a plunge into a 
costly rapid Brexit because or political institutions are unable to support a longer 
term commitment.  
We recall the phrase from Shakespeare’s Othello: “To mourn a mischief that is past 
and gone is the next way to draw new mischief on.” Both sides of the referendum 
debate seem to continue in election mode without ever actually listening to each 
other or addressing the practical challenge of actually implementing the referendum 
decision.25 It seems to us that the dysfunction of our political system may well make 
it impossible for the country to move on beyond the result of the referendum and the 
outcome will be the national tragedy of a rapid Brexit that, in line with the most 
pessimistic economic projections (“Project Fear”) results in a decline of UK GDP in 
coming years of perhaps 5-8% (the range of impacts from various studies assuming 
no replacement of the single market through a deep and comprehensive free trade 
agreement between the UK and the EU).  
 
 
  
                                            
25 A troubling reminder took place at our conference of Dec 2016, when one of the final panellists, a 
well-known proponent of Leave arguments, made the mistake of talking over the audience, without 
recognising or acknowledging the very real concerns voiced earlier in the day about trade impact of 
those arguing for Remain. The consequent hostility and breakdown of communication jn the room 
was both palpable and disheartening. Both sides have valid arguments and must listen to each other. 
 
 
 
53 
 
 
 
Further	reading		
 
There is a great deal to read on the trade implications of Brexit. We recommend in 
particular the following: 
 The various briefing papers of the Sussex University based UK Trade Policy 
Observatory https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/  
 The lucid arguments of Economists for Free Trade (formerly Economists for 
Brexit https://www.economistsforfreetrade.com/ )  
 Many excellent contributions at Vox-EU http://voxeu.org/taxonomy/term/5467  
 The thoughtful work, from a pro-leave perspective, of the Legatum institute 
Special Trade Commission http://www.li.com/programmes/special-trade-
commission  
 The thorough and balanced assessment of the Confederation of British 
Industry http://www.cbi.org.uk/business-issues/brexit-and-eu-negotiations/  
 The book by conference participant  David Bailey:. Bailey & L. Budd (Eds.), The 
Political Economy of Brexit. Agenda Publishing; especially the chapter Bailey, D., 
& De Propris, L. (2017). What does Brexit mean for UK Automotive and 
Industrial Policy? 
 Analysis by the Brussels think tank The European Centre for Political 
Economy http://ecipe.org/blog/tag/brexit/  
Those with a taste for more technical analysis can follow the work of the London 
School of Economics Centre for Economic Performance, the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies and the National Institute of Economic and Social Research. 
